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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Latin America has a rich history of financial crises. However, it was relatively unharmed by the 2007-
2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). This paper investigates why, and in particular the role of 
commodity prices and its institutional framework - in line with the fourth generation financial crisis 
model. We set up Early Warning Systems (EWS) for Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. These consist of 
an ordered logit model for currency crises for the period 1990-2007 with a dynamic factor model to 
deal with the large number of explanatory variables. We present forecasts for the period 2008-2009. 
 
We find that international indicators play an important role in explaining currency crises in Mexico, 
while banking indicators and commodities explain the currency crisis in Argentina and Brazil. 
Furthermore, debt and domestic economy indicators are relevant for Argentina and Mexico. Finally, 
we observe that currency crises in all three countries are related to institutional indicators. For none of 
the countries the Early Warning System would have issued an early warning for the GFC. 
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1 Introduction
The 2007–2009 global financial crisis has affected many countries including Latin America.
In the fall of 2008 Latin American currencies depreciated sharply versus the US dollar
(Brazil and Mexico depreciated by more than 40%, Argentina by 20%, see Figure 1), stock
markets plunged (Argentina and Brazil by more than 50%, see Figure 2), and spreads on
yields surged (Argentina quadrupled, Mexico and Brazil doubled, see Figure 3). These
dramatic changes did not trigger a financial crisis. The real economy contracted in 2009
in Mexico –influenza A-H1N1, recession in USA–, while Argentina and Brazil were hardly
affected. The financial sector was not in danger at any time and no debt crises surged.
The exchange rates returned relatively quickly to a level close to the pre-crisis situation,
particularly in Brazil and Mexico.
Figure 1: Nominal exchange rates indexed (2008M1 = 100) for the period 2008-2009 for
Mexico, Argentina and Brazil
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Would an Early Warning System have sent a warning? We address the question whether
the countries have learned from their past experiences, which makes this study also rele-
vant for other regions. Over time, various countries have experienced strong institutional
changes in the form of structural reforms, or changes in political power (e.g. Mexico that
saw PAN took over the presidency in 2000 after 70 years of continuous PRI governments).
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Figure 2: Stock market index for the period 2008-2009 for Mexico, Argentina and Brazil;
2008M1 = 100
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Figure 3: Sovereign bond interest rate spread for the period 2008-2009 for Mexico, Ar-
gentina and Brazil; basis points over US Treasuries
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2
We confine attention in this paper on the three most important economies of Latin
America: Argentina, Brazil and Mexico (LA-3).1 We focus on the period 1990 to 2009 be-
cause this period has essentially different characteristics than the 1970s and 1980s (hyper-
inflation, 1980s debt crisis, political system) and because of data availability. In addition,
we only consider currency crises, and abstract from banking crises and debt crises.
Dating currency crises is not straightforward. We choose to measure currency crises as
an ordered variable with responses ranging from 0 (for tranquil or non-crisis periods) to
3 (indicating a very deep crisis). We extend the crisis period by assigning the same value
for both the month of crisis and the preceding six months. This has been done by e.g.
Kaminsky (2006) and is justified since for the construction of early warning systems the
run-up to the crisis is as important as the crisis itself.
We apply the ordered logit model using dynamic factor models to cope with the large
number of crisis indicators. In that respect our paper is related to Cipollini and Kapetanios
(2009), who also apply dynamic factors in their Early Warning System. They use the
dynamic factor model of Stock and Watson (2002), and determine the number of factors
and the number of lags on the basis of the information criteria of Bai and Ng (2002). We
adopt the two-step framework of Doz, Giannone and Reichlin (2011), and use the criterion
of Otter, Jacobs and den Reijer (2011) to determine the number of factors.
As explanatory variables we will use monthly series from 1990 to 2007 to analyze the
three Latin American countries. Apart from the “usual suspects”—the common macroe-
conomic and financial variables—we also include institutional variables and commodity-
related indicators. Details on the explanatory variables are in Appendix A. We estimate
the ordered logit models up to and including 2007, and forecast for 2008-2009.
We find that currency crises in Mexico are driven by international indicators, and to a
lesser extent debt, by domestic economy and institutional indicators. Crises in Argentina
1The fourth economy, Chile, is not included because it has not experienced financial crises in the
1990–2009 period.
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are mainly related to banking and commodities, and to domestic economy and institutional
indicators. Banking and commodities indicators dominate in the explanation of currency
in Brazil; institutional indicators play a less important role. The fact that for all countries
the institutional factors play a significant role supports the fourth generation financial crisis
model. It also confirms previous work in which political indicators play a significant role
in crisis forecasting (e.g. Bussie`re and Mulder 2000). For none of the three countries the
Early Warning Systems would have issued a warning for the GFC.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. After a review of financial crises
and models, early warning systems and empirical studies for Latin America in Section
2, Section 3 discusses the method. The data are presented in Section 4, followed by the
empirical results in Section 5 and the analysis of out of sample performance in Section 6.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Review
2.1 Four generations of crises and models
Theoretical models for currency crises have been developed since the late 1970s, based
on the seminal work of Krugman (1979). The characteristics of crises have changed over
time and so have the models: the literature distinguishes four generations of financial
crisis (models). The first generation models explain the crises as the result of fundamental
inconsistencies in domestic policies, which at that time (1960s and 1970s) characterize the
crises. The crises are preceded by a deterioration in the fundamentals, such as recurring
budget deficits which are monetary financed, or persistent current account deficits which
exhaust the foreign reserves.
With the crisis of the European Monetary System in 1992-1993 a second generation
crisis appears, because the weak economic fundamentals alone could not explain such a
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dramatic drop in the exchange rate. Fundamentals still play a role: if these are very strong
then no currency attack will take place, and if these are very weak then the government
won’t defend the currency. But when the fundamentals are in a “grey zone”, multiple
equilibria are possible. Relative small changes can have a big impact, which is known
under the term “sunspot view”. When speculators suspect that the government is not
committed to defend the exchange rate (e.g. for restoring international competitiveness),
then a massive currency attack follows which can trigger a self-fulfilling devaluation (see
Obstfeld, 1996).
The Asian crisis of 1997–1998, a third generation crisis, gave a new boost to crisis
research. Banks and financial institutions expand and ease their loan granting policies prior
to the crisis, because they count on a government bailout in case of solvency problems. This
moral hazard behaviour leads to an excessive build-up of external private debt followed by a
collapse (see McKinnon and Pill, 1997). A currency devaluation can trigger a banking and
debt crisis when banks and government have a mismatch in the balance sheet: domestic
assets financed by foreign liabilities (see Chang and Velasco, 1998). Krugman (2003) adds
that a combination of factors such as panics in the international investment community,
policy mistakes in handling the crisis and poorly designed international rescue programs
cause a financial panic which results in currency crises, runs on banks, massive bankruptcies
and political turmoil.
The development of fourth generation models of financial crises is still under way. Breuer
(2004) refers to a model in which crises are determined by institutional factors. Poor insti-
tutional factors are the underlying cause for unsustainable policies, excessive borrowing and
lending, hyperinflation, etc. Although economic factors also play a role in the fourth gen-
eration models, the institutional factors set the conditions for economic outcomes. Many
databases that quantify institutional factors have become available recently, enabling more
research.
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2.2 Early Warning Systems
Early Warning Systems (EWS) are models that send signals or warnings well ahead in
time of a potential financial crisis. The dozens of EWS that have been developed differ
widely in the definition of a financial crisis, the period of estimation, data frequency and
the countries included in the database, the inclusion of indicators, the forecast horizon
and the statistical or econometric method (Jacobs, Kuper and Lestano, 2008). For an
overview see Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) and Abiad (2003). Most studies use
binary methods (logit or probit), the signals approach, Ordinary Least Squares, Markov
Switching models, binary recursive trees, contingent claims analysis or a combination of
these methods.
The typical EWS model is applied to a large number of emerging countries from all
over the world—in order to obtain sufficient crisis observations. This approach has re-
ceived criticism. To quote Abiad (2003): “The one-size-fits-all, panel data approach used
in estimating most Early Warning Systems (EWS) might be one of the causes of their only
moderate success”. Kaminsky (2006) confirms this and Beckmann, Menkhoff and Sawis-
chlewski (2006) also suggest that differences between geographical regions justify a regional
approach. A growing number of studies focuses on a geographic region—particularly South
East Asia and Central Europe and Latin America. Even within a region distinctions can be
made. Van den Berg, Candelon and Urbain (2008) construct country clusters for six Latin
American countries. In this study for the period 1985-2004, Argentina, Brazil and Peru are
grouped in one cluster because of similar inflation patterns, while Mexico, Uruguay and
Venezuela are grouped in the other cluster, due to important privatizations in the early
1990s.
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2.3 Empirical studies for Latin America
With its rich history of financial crises (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009), Latin American
countries—particularly Argentina, Brazil and Mexico—have been included in EWS mod-
els applied to emerging economies from all over the world. There are also studies with
an exclusive focus on the region. Kamin and Babson (1999) use a binomial probit model
with Vector AutoRegressions to distinguish between external and internal factors, to pre-
dict financial crises. They use panel data for six Latin American countries, for the period
1981–1998. Herrera and Garcia (1999) group the indicators into a composite index, to an-
alyze the indicators jointly. As in the signals approach, they set thresholds which indicate
financial crises. They apply their model to eight Latin American countries. Argentina’s
long history of currency and other financial crises is analyzed in studies such as Alvarez
Plata and Schrooten (2004), Kaminsky, Mati and Choueiri (2009) and Cerro and Iajya
(2009). Another crisis that has been researched widely is the Mexico 1994/1995 “tequila”
crisis. Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) focus on contagion, whereas Beziz and Petit
(1997) study the use of real time data on predicting the crisis.
3 Method
We first apply dynamic factor models to extract the factors from the indicators, and then
use the estimated factors as regressors in the ordered logit model, with a crisis dating
dummy as dependent variable.
3.1 Factor models
In factor models an observable set of n variables is expressed as the sum of mutually
orthogonal unobservable components: the unobservable common component (factors) and
the unobservable idiosyncratic component. The constructed factors are independent from
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each other, which means maximum information with a minimum number of factors in the
model. The primary reason for the popularity of factor models is that one can include a
large number of variables and let the model reduce this into a much smaller number of
factors (n >> r). This is a desirable feature since more data have become available for
policy makers and researchers at a more disaggregated level. The drawback of using factor
models to explain the occurrence of financial crises is the difficulty of interpretation—and
sometimes unexpected signs—that can be placed upon the factors that explain financial
crises.
Different types of factor models are distinguished: exact and approximate, static and
dynamic. When the factors and the idiosyncratic components are uncorrelated and i.i.d.,
then the model is static, exact, or strict. Exact factor models can be consistently estimated
by maximum likelihood. However the restrictions on the model are often not met in
empirical applications. When the number of variables goes to infinity, the correlation
restrictions of the exact factor model can be relaxed and one can use the approximate factor
model. In the static, approximate factor model the idiosyncratic components are (weakly)
correlated, which covers cross-correlation and heteroskedasticity between the idiosyncratic
errors and correlation between the common components and the idiosyncratic components
(see e.g. Barhoumi, Darne´ and Ferrara 2010).
Whereas static factor models only consider cross-sectional relations, the dynamic factor
model also takes into account lags and leads. Most dynamic factor models are approximate.
The dynamic factor model has the advantage that it takes into account both current and
temporal relationships, which makes it—in theory—superior to the static model. However,
empirical evidence is mixed. Barhoumi et al. (2010) for example conclude that dynamic
factor models with a large number of variables do not necessarily produce better forecasting
results of French GDP than static models with a small number of variables. Schumacher
(2007) also mentions a number of studies with mixed empirical success for the dynamic
8
factor model.
Static factor models
The static factor model has the following form:
Xi,t = λi,1f1,t + λi,2f2,t + ...+ λi,rfr,t + ui,t = Λft + ut, (1)
where Λ is an (n × r) matrix of factor loadings, ft is an (r × 1) vector of factors in
period t, i = 1, . . . , n and t = 1, . . . , T . The assumptions for the exact static factor model
are: E(ut) = 0, E(utu
′
t) = Σ = diag(σ
2
1, σ
2
2, . . . , σ
2
N), E(Ftu
′
t) = 0 and for the factors:
E(ft) = 0, E(ftf
′
t ) = Ωf .
The principal components method is used to estimate the factors. The principal com-
ponents of Xt are the factors:
Ft = S
′Xt = (S1S2 . . . Sr)′Xt, (2)
where the factor estimates Ft are the first r principal components ofXt, and Sj, j = 1, . . . , r,
are the eigenvectors that correspond to the r largest eigenvalues.
Dynamic factor models
The dynamic factor model extends the static factor model by also taking into account
correlations over time
Xt = A0ft + A1ft−1 + . . .+ Apft−p + t, (3)
where xt is the N × 1 vector of observations of explanatory variables in period t. The
variables are stationary, demeaned and standardize; ft is the r × 1 vector of common
9
components or factors. For a review of dynamic factor models we refer to Stock and
Watson (2011).
Dynamic factors can take several forms. Stock and Watson (1998) allow for time varying
loadings, but do not allow for autoregressive dynamics. Forni, Hallin, Lippi and Reichlin
(2005) adopt a different definition, which is christened a static factor representation of
the DFM by Stock and Watson (2005) and a pseudo DFM by Kapetanios and Marcellino
(2009)
Xt = AFt + t, (4)
where A ≡ [A0 A1 . . . Ap] and Ft ≡ [f ′t . . . f ′t−p]′. Hence, a dynamic factor model with r
common factors can be written as a static factor model with (p+ 1)r static factors.
The dynamics of the r common factors is represented by a vector autoregressive VAR(m)
process of order m
Ft = Γ(L)Ft + νt, (5)
where Γ(L)Ft = Γ1Ft−1 + . . .+ ΓmFt−m and νt ∼ N(0,Σν).
The factors can be estimated in the frequency domain (Forni et al., 2000, 2002), by
principal components (Bai and Ng, 2002; Stock and Watson, 2002a, 2002b), or by principal
components in combination with the Kalman filter (Forni et al. 2009; Doz, Giannone and
Reichlin, 2011, henceforth DGR). In this paper we employ the two-step approach of DGR.
In the first step preliminary estimates of the factors and estimates of the parameters of the
dynamic factor models are computed by a principal components analysis. In the second
step the factors are updated via the Kalman smoother. DGR use a slightly different version
of the static factor representation of the dynamic factor model, without dynamics, in the
measurement equation of their state space form, in combination with a VAR(p) for the
10
common factors in companion form as state equation
Xt =
(
A0 0 . . . 0
)

ft
ft−1
...
ft−p+1

+ t

ft
ft−1
...
ft−p+1

=

A1 A2 . . . Ap−1 Ap
Ir 0 . . . 0 0
0 Ir . . . 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . Ir 0


ft−1
ft−2
...
ft−p

+

Ir
0
...
0

νt.
Determination of the number of factors
One of the issues in factor analysis is the determination of the optimal number of factors.
Various procedures have been proposed, e.g. the Bayesian Information Criterium, the
Kaiser Criterium and Cattell’s scree test. The number of factors is better overestimated
than underestimated, because the factors are still estimated consistently if the number of
factors is overestimated (Breitung and Eickmeier, 2006).
With the large dimensional factor models of recent years many studies have proposed
solutions and consistent estimators for the number of factors using different factor model
and distributional assumptions. See e.g. Bai and Ng (2002, 2007), Amengual and Watson
(2007), Kapetanios (2010), Hallin, and Liˇska (2007), Harding (2009), Jacobs and Otter
(2008), and Onatski (2009). Here we employ the criterion of Otter, Jacobs and Den Reijer
(2011), which is associated with Onatski’s (2009) test statistic, and related to the scree
test.
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Interpreting the factors
Using factor models comes at a cost. Determining the economic relevance of factors and
interpreting the factors in a meaningful way is problematic. The factor loadings can be
used to assign a label to each of the common factors. This is a good strategy for static
factors, but for dynamic factors it is cumbersome. Here we look at correlations between
dynamic factors and the indicators (following e.g. Breitung and Eickmeier, 2006).2
Interpreting estimation results using factors as dependent variables needs to be done
with great care. Most indicators feature in more than one factor, so focusing on a single
factor only partially explains the full impact of an indicator on the probability of a crisis,
and may even lead to unexpected results.
3.2 Crisis dating
Identifying and dating currency crises has been debated since the mid 1990s. Two ap-
proaches can be distinguished: the successful attack approach and the speculative pressure
approach. In this study, we opt for the speculative pressure approach, which was initial-
ized by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995). In this approach we distinguish events
from crises to identify and date currency crises. Events consist of significant changes in
exchange rate arrangements, such as official decisions to float or fix the exchange rate, to
widen the fluctuation band, etc. Crises consist of periods in which the exchange rate comes
under speculative attack. The set of crises periods is not a subset of the set of events. For
example, when the exchange rate arrangement is not preceded by a significant exchange
market pressure, then this is not considered as a crisis. Also the set of events does not
include the set of crises. For example, when a speculative attack is unsuccessful so that
there is no realignment of exchange rates, then it is not an event, but it is considered a
2An alternative is to place the set of variables in well-defined groups, and apply factor analysis to each
of the groups. Obviously, the factors derived in this way are no longer orthogonal.
12
crisis. In other words, also unsuccessful attacks should be considered a crisis. A currency
attack can be unsuccessful when it is successfully defended by the monetary authorities
through the use of international reserves, by increasing the interest rates or by restricting
transactions in foreign currency.
The speculative pressure index, or the Exchange Market Pressure Index (EMPI), is
defined as a weighted average of exchange rate changes, changes in the international reserve
and changes in the interest rates. A crisis is identified if the index exceeds an upper bound.
We follow the modified definition of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Kaminsky (2006):
the weighted average of exchange rate changes and reserve changes, with weights such
that the two components of the index have equal conditional volatilities. Periods with
hyperinflation are excluded from the periods without hyperinflation: for each subcategory
an index is constructed and threshold exceedances determined. To determine the crises we
deviate from Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), who identify a crisis when the observation
exceeds the mean by more than three standard deviations. We maintain this definition to
identify “very deep” crises. Following Cerro and Iajya (2009) we extend the definition of
crises by introducing “deep” crises (two adjacent months with exceedance between 2 and
3 times the standard deviation) and “mild” crises (two adjacent months with exceedance
between 1 and 2 times the standard deviation). The ordinal variable that indicates crises
periods is constructed as follows: the value 0 indicates no crisis periods, the value 1 is
assigned to mild crises, 2 to deep crises and 3 to very deep crises. As is common in early
warning systems of currency crisis, we will use the same dummy variable for the crisis
entry month and the run-up to the crisis. In this paper we choose a period of six months
preceding the crisis entry. In case a crisis follows within six months upon a crisis, then the
second crisis is considered a continuation and is eliminated. If types of crises overlap we
assign the highest ordinal number to that crisis.
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3.3 Ordered logit model
As our dependent variable can only take four values (0=no crisis; 1=mild crisis; 2=deep
crisis, and 3=very deep crisis), we employ an ordered choice model, which extends the
binary choice model, allowing for a natural ordering in the outcomes y. Assume that there
are N + 1 possible outcomes, then
y =

0 if y∗ ≤ µ1,
1 if µ1 < y
∗ ≤ µ2,
2 if µ2 < y
∗ ≤ µ3
...
N if µN < y
∗,
(6)
where y is the observed ordinal variable, and y∗ is the continuous latent variable that is
equal to
y∗ = Z = α + βX. (7)
The limits µi separate the various outcomes, and are estimated simultaneously with the
parameters α and β.
We use the ordered logit model, because the logistic distribution (logit model) has wider
tails than the normal distribution (probit model). This is preferable if an event has a very
low frequency, as is the case in financial crises (Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig
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2003). The probabilities for each of the outcomes are:
P (y = 0) =
1
1 + e−(Z−µ1)
,
P (y = 1) =
1
1 + e−(Z−µ2)
− 1
1 + e−(Z−µ1)
,
... (8)
P (y = N) = 1− 1
1 + e−(Z−µN )
.
Interpretation of the parameters in an ordered choice model is not trivial (see Kennedy,
2008, pp.258–259 and the references therein). Kennedy suggests to omit the intercept α to
facilitate interpretation. One way to interpret the outcomes is by calculating the ratio of
two parameter estimates, i.e, the relative change in one explanatory variable to compensate
for a change in another explanatory variable.
4 Data
Our sample starts in the early 1990s, when the effects of last spillovers of the 1980s Latin
American debt crisis faded away. The analysis for Argentina starts after the introduction
of the Convertibility Plan (April 1991) and for Brazil after the introduction of the Real
Plan (July 1994), which both can be regarded as a structural break with the hyperinflation
periods. Mexico did not experience any period of hyperinflation in the 1990s.
To identify currency crises we follow the EMPI definition of Kaminsky (2006), but
take into account the severity of the crisis. We categorize the severity of crises as mild,
deep and very deep. Very deep crises are rare; each of the countries under investigation
experienced only one very deep crisis in the in-sample period: Mexico (December 1994),
Brazil (January 1999) and Argentina (January 2002). Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the crisis
observations.
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Figure 4: Actual crisis dates for Argentina for the period 1991-2007
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Figure 5: Actual crisis dates for Brazil for the period 1994-2007
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Figure 6: Actual crisis dates for Mexico for the period 1990-2007
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For the explanatory variables we select series based on three criteria: (i) series have to
be complete, i.e. no missing observations; and (ii) series have to be used in the literature.
There are however some data limitations. Not all time series are sufficiently long which
limits the selection of explanatory variables. Another challenge is the mixed frequency of
the time series. The selected series can be classified into separate categories:
• 13 external economic indicators, among which the deviation from the trend of the
real exchange rate, exchange rate volatility, growth of exports, imports and foreign
reserves, import cover, ratio of M2 to foreign reserves. Source: IFS (IMF).
• 16 domestic economic indicators, among which domestic real interest rate, inflation,
M2 multiplier, industrial production. Source: IFS.
• 16 institutional indicators, among which election dates, Herfindahl indices, political
stability, corruption. Sources: ICRG, DPI.
• 10 debt indicators, among which total debt, short term debt, debt service, arrears.
Sources: WDI/GDF (World Bank).
• 25 banking sector indicators for Argentina (14 for Brazil and Mexico), among which
credit to public sector, to private sector, ROE, deposits. Sources: Financial Structure
(World Bank), WDI/GDF, IFS.
• 7 global and financial markets indicators, among which economic growth in world,
US yield, share market index returns, bond yield country spread. Sources: IFS, GEM
(World Bank), Economatica.
• 12 commodity related indicators, among which prices of oil, metals, agricultural prod-
ucts, exports and imports of fuel, agricultural products, food and metals. Sources:
IFS, WDI/GDF.
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For a complete overview, including definitions and transformations, we refer to Appendix A.
The series have been tested for non-stationarity (using Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests)
and visually inspected for seasonal effects. Where necessary a transformation was made to
render them stationary. To deal with mixed frequencies in series, we apply simple quadratic
interpolations. All series are normalized, i.e. demeaned and divided by its sample standard
deviation.
5 Empirical results
We estimate the ordered logit model for Argentina, Brazil and Mexico for the period up to
and including 2007, and we forecast for the 2008–2009 period. In this section we discuss
both the dynamic factor model outcomes and correlations with individual indicators, and
the estimation results for the ordered logit models.3
5.1 Argentina
The criterion of Otter, Jacobs and Den Reijer (2011) suggests 11 factors for Argentina.
When focusing on the variables with the largest correlation (positive or negative) we can
label each factor.4 Here we give special emphasis to institutional and commodity-related
indicators:
• Factor 1 is strongly correlated with banking and commodity indicators. The
banking indicators consist of credit granting and profitability variables and are pos-
itively and negatively correlated with this factor. The commodity indicators are
primarily related to agriculture and food exports; all are negatively correlated with
3For all three countries we also employed static factors as regressors in the ordered logit models and
found that differences were marginal. See Appendix C.
4The complete list of factors with the ten indicators with highest correlation can be found in Appendix B.
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the factor, which implies that an increase in commodity exports leads to a lower
factor.
• Factor 2 is dominated by domestic economic indicators. Economic growth and
savings are negatively correlated with the factor, the real interest rate and the M2
multiplier are positively correlated with the factor.
• Factor 3 is a mixed factor as it does not have any dominating category. Some
indicators stand out for their high correlation with the factor. This applies to the
T-bill and the return in the US market.
• Factor 4 is dominated by banking and debt indicators and complemented by
institutional indicators (bureaucratic quality and government stability—these enter
with opposite signs into the factor).
• Factor 5 can be labelled the institutional factor. These indicators are negatively
correlated with the factor.
• Factor 6 is strongly correlated with banking and external economic indicators.
The banking indicators are mainly credit granting variables while the external eco-
nomic indicators are related to imports.
• Factor 7 is—like factors 1 and 4—associated with banking indicators.
• Factor 8 is a mixed factor as it does not have any dominating category.
• Factor 9 is influenced mainly by commodity and debt indicators. The commodity
indicators are related to imports and are negatively correlated with the factor.
• Factors 10 and 11 are very diverse. The variables have low correlations with the
factor.
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Estimation results
The dynamic factor combination which yields the best fit in the ordered logit model has 4
dynamic factors and 2 lags. Appendix C shows that factors 4, 6 and 8 are not significant
at a 5% significant level. Factors 2 and 9 increase the probability of a crisis. The adjusted
pseudo R2 is 0.705 and the fit is shown graphically for the in-sample period 1991-M5 to
2007-M12 in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Actual and fitted data, and the residuals form the ordered logit model for
Argentina for the period 1991-2007
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Interpreting the outcomes in terms of the underlying indicators is not trivial, as we
argued above. Nevertheless, it can be seen that banking indicators and, to a lesser extent,
debt and domestic economy indicators play an important role in the explanation of currency
crises. In the following, we focus on commodities prices (factors 1 and 9) and institutions
(mainly factor 5) only.
Factors 1 and 9 have opposite signs in the ordered logit model. Although this may
seem contradictory at first sight, this is not so if we realize what each factor contains:
factor 1 consists of commodities exports indicators (negative correlation), while factor 9
consists of commodities imports indicators (negative correlation). Increasing exports lead
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to a decrease in factor 1 which is associated with a higher probability of a currency crisis.
Increasing imports lead to a decrease in factor 9 which is associated with a lower probability
of a currency crisis. In other words, in the run-up to the crisis the exports of commodities
increase and the imports of commodities decrease. A plausible explanation is the need for
foreign currency to relieve the pressure on the exchange rate to depreciate.
With respect to the role of institutions we arrive at the unlikely conclusion that bet-
ter institutions (negatively correlated with factor 5) increase the probability of a crisis
(negative sign in the ordered logit model). To identify the importance of the institutional
indicators we re-estimated the model without institutional variables. The results, reported
in Appendix C, show that the fit worsens; the adjusted pseudo R2 decreases from 0.70 to
0.47. In addition, the re-estimated model overestimates the crises probabilities: mild and
deep crises come out as deep and very deep crises, respectively.
We conclude that both commodities and institutional indicators play an important
role in many of the factors, and by this have an impact on crisis probabilities. Further-
more, banking sector and, to a lesser extent, debt and domestic economy indicators play
important roles in the explanation of currency crises.
5.2 Brazil
The criterion of Otter et al. (2011) suggests 9 factors for Brazil. The complete list of
factors and the ten indicators with strongest correlations can be found in Appendix B.
• Factor 1 consists of a wide range of indicators, without any dominating category.
• Factor 2 is dominated by banking indicators, primarily related to credit granting.
All indicators are negatively correlated with the factor, so an increase in the indicator
leads to a lower value of the factor.
• Factor 3 consists of a wide range of indicators, without any dominating category.
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• Factor 4 is associated with commodities and global indicators. Commodities
primarily contain commodities imports (negative correlation) and global indicators
are associated with global economic growth (negative correlation).
• Factor 5 is dominated by institutional and commodities indicators. Two of the
three institutional indicators are negatively correlated with the factor. Agriculture
is strongly, negatively correlated with this factor, implying that an increase in the
value added by agriculture sector implies a decrease in the factor.
• Factor 6 is dominated by commodities and institutional indicators. While agri-
culture imports and the petroleum price are positively correlated wit the factor, fuel
exports are negatively correlated. The institutional indicators are related to the eco-
nomic and investment state. Both institutional indicators are negatively correlated
with the factor.
• Factor 7 is related to institutional and external economic indicators. The
external economic indicators are all related to the foreign reserves. The institutional
factors have a political character. More concentrated government (higher Herfindahl
index) and a more disperse opposition are related to a higher factor, while improved
law and order leads to a lower factor.
• Factor 8 is dominated by bank indicators.
• Factor 9 is mixed. The correlations with the factor are very low.
Estimation results
The combination of 3 dynamic factors and 2 lags yields the best fit in the ordered logit
model for Brazil. We add two dummy variables: to identify an election year (elections for
the executive power) and contagion (a currency crisis in one of the other two countries).
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The ordered logit results are presented in Appendix C. Factors 1, and 7 are not significant
at the 5% significant level. Also the dummy variables are not significant. Factors 4 and
6 lower the probability of a crisis. The adjusted pseudo R2 for the DFM is 0.225 and the
fit is shown graphically for the in-sample period 1994-M8 to 2007-M12 in Figure 8. We
can observe in the graph that the model overestimates crises events and underestimates
crisis recovery periods, which explains the relatively low adjusted pseudo R2. Since we are
interested in crisis events, the over- and underestimation is not much of a worry—we care
more about a correct timing.
Figure 8: Actual and fitted data, and the residuals form the ordered logit model for Brazil
for the period 1994-2007
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Banking sector indicators enter all factors. This shows the importance of the sector for
the occurrence of currency crises. Domestic economic factors seem to play a minor role.
Factors 4, 5, and 6 (related to commodity prices) show ambiguous signs in the ordered
logit model. Factor 4 consists of commodities imports indicators. An increase in commodi-
ties imports is associated with a higher probability of a currency crisis. From factor 5 we
can derive that with increasing food exports and increasing value added by the agriculture
sector the probability of a crisis decreases. Combining the effect, we can observe that in
the run-up to a crisis commodities imports increase and food exports decrease. Under a
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fixed exchange rate regime where prices are not adjusted through the exchange rate, the
imports become relatively cheap and exports relatively expensive. This situation is not
sustainable and will culminate into a devaluation of the currency. Factor 6 has opposite
signs and does not fit in this mechanism.
The institutional factors show a mixed picture: an improvement in bureaucratic quality,
democratic accountability and internal conflict is associated with a lower probability of a
crisis. However, this relation is not followed in improvements in the law and order situation
and in the non-political institutional indicators (socio-economic circumstances, investment
profile). The Herfindahl indices seem to indicate that governments which consist of less
political parties have a higher probability of crises.
We conclude that the probability of a currency crisis in Brazil is mainly influenced by
commodities, banking and institutional indicators. In contrast with Argentina and Mexico,
the important categories in Brazil are limited to these three categories only.
5.3 Mexico
According to the criterion of Otter et al. (2011) the number of factors for Mexico is 7.
The complete list of factors with the ten indicators which have the strongest correlation
can be found in Appendix B.
• Factor 1 is dominated by commodities indicators and to a lesser extent by banking
and external economic indicators. The commodities consist of both exports and
imports, yet all indicators have the same negative correlation in this factor.
• Factor 2 is strongest correlated with debt and economic domestic indicators.
All debt indicators are negatively correlated with the factor. The two commodities
indicators are exports related to agriculture and food; both show a negative correla-
tion with the factor.
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• Factor 3 is a mixed factor and consists of banking, domestic economic and insti-
tutional indicators. Both institutional indicators are negatively correlated with the
factor. The other categories have positive and negative correlations with the factor.
• Factor 4 consists of external economic and global indicators and is comple-
mented by institutional indicators. The indicators are related to imports, economic
growth in the USA and interest rates in the USA. Given the fact that Mexico’s largest
trading partner is the USA, this strong correlation should not come as a surprise.
The institutional indicators show positive and negative correlations with the factor.
• Factor 5 consists of a wide range of indicators, without any dominating category.
• Factor 6 is dominated by banking indicators, which all show the same (negative)
correlation with the factor.
• Factor 7 has low correlations with the factor and should therefore be interpreted
with caution. The categories that dominate are external economic and global
indicators.
Estimation results
The combination of 3 dynamic factors and 2 lags yields the best fit in the ordered logit
model for Mexico. As in the model for Brazil we add two dummy variables to identify
an election year and to include contagion. Appendix C presents the estimation results.
Factors 1, 5 and 6 are not significant at the 5% significant level; factors 2 and 3 lower
the probability of a crisis. The contagion dummy variable is not significant. The adjusted
pseudo R2 is 0.558 and the fit is shown graphically for the in-sample period 1990-M1 to
2007-M12 in Figure 9.
The categories that dominate the factors are external economy and global indicators.
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Figure 9: Actual and fitted data, and the residuals form the ordered logit model for Mexico
for the period 1990-2007
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Other important categories are the banking sector, domestic economy indicators and in-
stitutional indicators.
Commodities are mainly represented in factor 1, and to a lesser extent in factor 2.
Factor 1 is not significant at the 5% level. The interpretation of this estimate would have
been hard because the correlations of all indicators with the factor is negative while we
expect to see a difference between exports and imports. The two commodity indicators in
factor 2 are related to exports and are negatively correlated with the factor. This implies
that an increase in the commodities exports will decrease factor 2, which will increase the
probability of a crisis. In other words, in the run-up to a crisis the exports of commodities
increase. A plausible explanation is the need for foreign currency to relieve the pressure
on the exchange rate to depreciate.
Institutional indicators do not dominate any factor, but are present in factors 3, 4, 6
and 7. The relations with factors and crises are ambiguous.
We conclude that the probability of a currency crisis in Mexico is mainly influenced
by external economy and global indicators, which confirms the importance of international
trade, in particular with its main trade partner, the USA. Domestic economy, debt and
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institutional indicators are less important in the explanation of currency crises. Contrary
to Argentina and Brazil, neither commodities nor banking indicators play an important
role in the explanation of currency crises in Mexico.
6 Out of sample performance
In this section we test the performance of the estimated model out of sample. We extrap-
olate the dynamic factors, with simple ARMA processes, and forecast the probabilities of
a mild, deep and very deep crisis in the period 2008–2009.
Argentina
The forecasts under the dynamic factor model extrapolation results in a 100.0% probability
that no crisis will take place in any of the months in 2008 and 2009. The ordered logit
model does not pick up the mild currency crisis in October 2008.
Brazil
Table 1 shows crises forecasts for Brazil. Crisis probabilities differ from zero, but are fairly
low. The probability of a mild crisis is equal to around 6 per cent at the end of 2008, the
beginning of 2009. Brazil experienced a mild currency crisis in September-November 2008,
which is not picked up by the EWS.
Mexico
Table 2 shows crises probability forecasts for Mexico. Crises probabilities are close to zero.
Mexico experienced a very deep currency crisis in October 2008. This is not forecast by
the ordered logit model.
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Table 1: Forecasts for Brazil for 2008-2009, for a mild, deep and very deep crisis
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Table 2: Forecasts for Mexico for 2008-2009, for a mild, deep and very deep crisis

	










    
    
	    

    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
  	  
 
   
    
	    

    
  	  
 	   
   	 
   	 
   	 
   	 
   	 
   	 
29
In the late Fall of 2008 all three countries experienced a currency crisis (Argentina and
Brazil: mild; Mexico: very deep). Based on information up to and including 2007, our
ordered logit models did not pick up this crisis. Forecasts of the indicators that played an
important role in earlier crises did not indicate a crisis.
It should be realized that the forecasts we present here are based solely on the infor-
mation that is available in December 2007. For the years 2008 and 2009 the factors are
extrapolated using time series models. So the global shock caused by the fall of Lehman
Brothers in the USA in September 2008 is not taken into account. Using the realizations
of the indicators we should be able to more precisely forecast crises. This could be done
either by using the estimates from the factor models until 2007, or by re-estimating the
factor models using the values of the indicators until and including the year 2009.
7 Conclusion
The fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 sent a shock all over the world; emerging
markets were affected severely. Exchange rates depreciated by more than 40% (Mexico,
Brazil) and share prices decreased by more than 50% (Argentina, Brazil). Despite relative
solid fundamentals the currencies showed a sharp depreciation, particularly countries with
high trade and financial flows with the USA and countries with fiscal, trade or financing
balances deficits. International trade was also severely affected. Given the rich history of
financial crises of the three Latin American countries that we studied, it is remarkable that
in none of these countries the effect spread to the banking sector or affected debt servicing.
In 2009 the exchange rates, stock prices and interest spreads reversed and returned to
hoover between the pre-crisis and crisis levels.
This paper investigates why Latin America was relatively unharmed by the GFC. To
that purpose we set up ordered logit models for Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, using
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dynamic factor models to reduce the dimension of the information set. We find that
currency crises in Argentina and Brazil are driven by banking and commodities indicators,
while international indicators matter most in Mexico. Furthermore, we see that in all
three Latin American countries institutional indicators play a role. This result supports
the fourth generation model in which institutional factors are important. It also confirms
previous work in which political indicators play a significant role in crisis forecasting
With an improved institutional framework, a healthier financial system (better reg-
ulation, higher profitability margins, lower non-performing loans) and lower debt levels
the countries have created a better environment than in the 1990s. This however does
not mean that these countries “graduated from financial crises”—to borrow a term from
Qian, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). The LA-3 passed a serious test with the GFC, but its
characteristics were very distinct from previous crises.
Future research will include: (i) using data with mixed frequencies (monthly, quarterly,
annual) and incomplete series as in Aruoba, Diebold and Scotti (2009), which allows the
inclusion of a wide range of indicators, particularly institutional indicators; (ii) adding
banking crises and debt crises, in order to distinguish between currency crises which remain
isolated as opposed to currency crises that are accompanied by other crises and generally
have a stronger impact on the economy and a longer recovery period; and (iii) carrying
out a real-time analysis.
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A Data
Indicator Code Definition and source Transformation Data freq Countries
Economic indicators: external sector
1 Real Exchange Rate 
(RER): deviation 
from trend
RER_DEV RER = e (Pf / P), with:                                                                                       
e = nominal exchange rate Local Currency Unit per US 
dollar (IFS: AE.ZF)                                                                    
P = domestic price level: Consumer Price Index (IFS: 
64..ZF)                                                                                                                 
Pf = foreign price level: Consumer Price Inflation in 
USA (IFS 111.64..ZF)  
deviation from 5 
year moving 
average
Monthly A, B, M
2 Exchange rate 
volatility
ERVOL Monthly volatility of the nominal exchange rate (IFS: 
AE..ZF) in the current month and the 47 months 
preceding. 
Standard 
deviation 
Monthly A, B, M
3 Export growth D_EXP Exports F.O.B.; in USD (IFS: 70.D..ZF) 12 months 
percentage 
change
Monthly A, B, M
4 Import growth D_IMP Imports F.O.B.; in USD (IFS: 71.VD..ZF)                                    12 months 
percentage 
change
Monthly A, B, M
5 Terms of Trade TOT ToT = exports prices / imports prices                                                                
Two ways to define this:                                                                                 
(i) Export price index (= IFS-76) / import price index (= 
IFS-76X) -Mex;                                                                               
(ii) Unit value of exports: IFS-74D ; Unit value of 
imports: IFS-75D - Arg & Bra
None (ratio) Arg & Bra (series 
74, 75): quarterly,                                      
Mex (series 76): 
monthly
A, B, M
6 Ratio of Current 
Account to GDP
CA_GDP Current account, in USD: IFS-78AL (78ALDZF…) = 
balance on goods, services and income plus current 
transfers.                                                                                                              
GDP, in nominal USD: IFS 99, converted in USD by 
average nominal exchange rate (IFS: ..RF.ZF... for Arg 
& Bra, ..WF.ZF... for Mexico). 
None (ratio) Quarterly A, B, M
7 Net Portfolio 
Investment / GDP
NETPI_GDP Portfolio assets (IFS: 78BFDZF...) - portfolio liabilities 
(IFS: 78BGDZF...). Both in USD. GDP in USD: see 
CA_GDP
None (ratio) Quarterly A, B, M
8 Ratio FDI to GDP NETFDI_GDP FDI outflow = IFS series 78BDDZF… and FDI inflow = 
IFS series 78BEDZF… (both in USD).                                                                      
Arg and Bra: net FDI; Mex: FDI inflow                                      
GDP in USD: see CA_GDP
None (ratio) Quarterly A, B, M
9 Ratio of Financial 
Account to GDP
FA_GDP Financial account = balance of all accounts: from trade 
to FDI and portfolio investments.                                                                                                                                    
Financial Account = IFS: 78BJDZF…                                                                 
GDP in USD: see CA_GDP.
None (ratio) Quarterly B, M
10 Trade openness D_TRD_OPEN Trade openness = sum of absolute value of exports 
and imports, divided by nominal GDP in USD.                                                                                                                                                                                                          
IFS: 78AADZF… + 78ADDZF… (= exports of goods and 
services) and 78ABDZF… + 78AEDZF… (= imports of 
goods and services)                                                                                  
GDP in USD: see CA_GDP
12 months 
percentage
change
Quarterly A, B, M
11 Growth of forex 
reserves
D_RES Foreign exchange reserves, excluding gold; in USD 
(IFS: 1.LD..DZF)
12 months 
percentage 
change
Monthly A, B, M
12 Ratio of M2 to forex 
reserves
M2RES M2: IFS series  59MB.ZF… (Arg > 2000; Bra & Mex), 
Central Bank Rep.Argentina (< 2000, Arg).                                                                                                                
Converted into USD with end-of-period nominal 
exchange rate: IFS series ..AE.ZF...; Foreign Exchange 
Reserves: IFS series .1L.DZF…
None (ratio) Monthly A, B, M
13 Import cover D_IMPCOV Forex Reserves excl.gold from IFS, in USD (.1L.DZF…) 
and imports F.O.B. from IFS, in USD (IFS: 71.VD..ZF)                                    
12 months 
percentage 
change
Monthly A, B, M
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Economic indicators: domestic real and public sector 
1 real GDP growth D_RGDP GDP in nominal LCU. IFS: 99B..ZF... (Arg > 1995; Bra 
& Mex), INDEC (Arg < 1995).                               
Consumer Price index (IFS: 64..ZF…); 
12 months 
percentage 
change
Quarterly A, B, M
2 GDP per capita D_RGDPCAP GDP divided by total population;                                                       
GDP: see D_RGDP;                                                                        
Total population: IFS-99Z. 
12 months 
percentage 
change
Annual A, B, M
3 Unemployment D_UNEMPL Unemployment as % of (# unemployed + # 
employed). IFS: 67R..ZF…
12 months 
percentage 
change
Annual < 2001, 
quarterly > 
2001
B
4 Government 
consumption 
expenditure to 
GDP
GOVCONS_GDP Gov.Cons. (in LCU): IFS 91F..ZF…                                                                          
GDP (in LCU): IFS 99B
None (ratio) Quarterly B, M
5 Household 
consumption 
expenditure (incl. 
NPISHS) to GDP
HHCONS_GDP Household cons: IFS series 96F..ZF…                            
GDP (in LCU): IFS 99B
None (ratio) Arg < 1993: 
annual, > 1993 
quarterly;                    
Bra & Mex: 
quarterly
A, B, M
6 Ratio of 
government 
revenues to GDP
D_GOVREV Gov't revenues: integrate two incomplete series 
(IFS: c1...BA… and a1...CG…).                                                                                              
GDP (in LCU): IFS 99B
12 months 
percentage
change
Quarterly B, M
7 Ratio of 
government 
expenses to GDP
D_GOVEXP Gov't expenses: integrate two incomplete series 
(IFS: c2...BA… and a2...CG…).                                                                                              
GDP (in LCU): IFS 99B
12 months 
percentage
change
Quarterly B, M
8 fiscal balance to 
GDP  
GOVBAL_GDP Budget = difference between revenues (IFS: 
c1...BA… and a1...CG…) and expenses (IFS: c2...BA… 
and a2...CG…)                                                                                                              
GDP (in LCU): IFS 99B
None (ratio) Quarterly B, M
9 Change in 
inventories to GDP
INVCHG_GDP Change in inventories (in LCU) IFS 93I.CZF...                                     
GDP (in LCU): 99B.RWF… 
None (ratio) Quarterly M
10 Inflation (CPI) INFLAT Consumer Price Inflation (IFS: 64..ZF) 12 months 
percentage 
change
Monthly A, B, M
11 Growth of 
industrial 
production
D_INDPROD Industrial production index: Bra & Mex: IFS-66.                                                       
Arg: Datastream (code AGIPTOT.G)
12 months
percentage 
change
Monthly A, B, M
12 Domestic Savings GDSAV_GDP Ratio of savings to GDP: WDI-code: NY.GDS.TOTL.ZS   None (ratio) Annual A, B, M
13 Gross capital 
formation
GFCAP_GDP Arg & Mex: 93E.CZF... and 99B.RWF… (quarterly)                                                                                                                   
Bra: WDI code: NE.GDI.TOTL.KD.ZG (annual)
12 months
percentage 
change
Arg & Mex: 
quarterly,                    
Bra: annual
A, B, M
14 Domestic real 
interest rate
REALINT 6 month time deposit rate deflated by CPI: 
(1+Rnominal) / (1+Inflation) - 1  , with:                             
6 months time deposit rate (IFS: 60L..ZF)                                                                    
CPI (IFS: 64..ZF)
See formula Monthly A, B, M
15 M2 growth (real 
LCU)
D_M2 M2: see M2RES 12 months 
percentage 
change
Monthly A, B, M
16 M2 money 
multiplier
M2MULT Ratio of M2 to monetary base.                                                       
M2: see M2RES                                                                
Base money: IFS: 19MA.ZF…
ratio Monthly A, B, M
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Financial market indicators
1 Sovereign Bond 
Interest Rate 
Spreads, basis 
points over US 
Treasuries
INTSPREAD GEM: difference between local government interest 
rate on bonds in USD and US government on bonds 
in USD.
None (spread) Monthly B
2 J.P. Morgan 
Emerging Markets 
Bond Index 
(EMBI+): monthly 
return
EMBI_RET GEM: index that measures the value of the bonds. Monthly return Monthly B
3 Return on the 
major stock index
STOCKRET Major stock index from each country (IPC for 
Mexico, Merval for Argentina and BOVESPA for 
Brazil). In own currency. Source: Economatica.
Monthly return Monthly A, B, M
Debt indicators
1 Ratio total debt to 
GDP
DEBT_GDP WDI code for total -external- debt (in USD): 
DT.DOD.DECT.CD                                                                      
GDP (in USD): see CA_GDP
None (ratio) Annual A, B , M
2 ST debt / total 
debt
STD_DEBT Short term debt: (WDI code) DT.DOD.DSTC.CD                                                                                           
Total debt: (WDI code) DT.DOD.DECT.CD
None (ratio) Annual A, B , M
3 Use of IMF credit 
to GDP
IMF_GDP IMF credit: (WDI code) DT.DOD.DIMF.CD                                                   
GDP (in USD): see CA_GDP
None (ratio) Annual A, B , M
4  Arrears to total 
debt
ARR_TDEBT WDI code for interest arrears (USD): 
DT.IXA.DPPG.CD                                                                     
WDI code for principal arrears (USD): 
DT.AXA.DPPG.CD                                                               
WDI code for total external debt (USD): 
DT.DOD.DECT.CD
None (ratio) Annual A, B , M
5 Debt reduction / 
total debt
REDU_TDEBT Debt reduction: (WDI code) DT.DFR.DPPG.CD                                                                                           
Total debt: (WDI code) DT.DOD.DECT.CD
None (ratio) Annual A, B , M
6 LT PNG debt / total 
debt
D_LTPNG_TDEBT LT Private and Non Guaranteed debt: (WDI code) 
DT.DOD.PRVS.CD                                                                                           
Total debt: (WDI code) DT.DOD.DECT.CD
12 months 
percentage 
change. 
Annual A, B , M
7 LT PPG debt / total 
debt
D_LTPPG_TDEBT LT Public and Publicly Guaranteed debt: (WDI code) 
DT.DOD.PUBS.CD                                                                                           
Total debt: (WDI code) DT.DOD.DECT.CD
12 months 
percentage
change. 
Annual A, B , M
8 International 
reserves to total 
external debt
D_RES_DEBT Total debt: (WDI code) DT.DOD.DECT.CD                                      
Reserves (IFS code): .1L.DZF…
12 months 
percentage 
change
Annual A, B , M
9 Ratio of debt 
service to exports
DSERV_EXP WDI code for debt service (current USD): 
DT.TDS.DECT.CD  IFS code for exports (millions  of 
current USD): 70..DZF...
None (ratio) Annual A, B , M
10 Ratio of debt 
service to reserves
DSERV_RES Debt service (WDI code): DT.TDS.DECT.CD                                       
Reserves (IFS code): .1L.DZF…
None (ratio) Annual A, B , M
Bank sector indicators
1 Ratio of domestic 
credit to the public 
sector to GDP
DCREDPUB Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of 
GDP) (WDI code = FS.AST.DOMS.GD.ZS)
 minus
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)
(WDI code = FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS)
None (ratio) Annual A, M
2 Ratio of 
commercial bank 
lending to GDP
DCREDBANK Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of 
GDP). WDI code = FS.AST.DOMS.GD.ZS
None (ratio) Annual A, B, M
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3 Liquid liabilities (% 
of GDP)
D_LIQLIAB Code: ll_usd. Source: Financial Structure, from 
World Bank (FS/WB) and Beck et al. 2000, 2009
12 months 
percentage 
change
Annual A, B, M
4 Central bank 
assets (% of GDP)
CBASSET Claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the 
Central Bank as a share of GDP. FS/WB code: cbagdp
12 months 
percentage 
change
Annual B
5 Deposit money 
bank assets (% of 
GDP)
D_DMBANKAS Claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by 
deposit money banks as a share of GDP. FS/WB 
code: dbagdp
12 months 
percentage 
change
Annual A, B, M
6 Private credit by all 
financial 
institutions (% of 
GDP)
D_PCRED_GDP Private credit by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions to GDP.                                        
FS/WB code: pcrdbofgdp
12 months 
percentage 
change
Annual A
7 Private credit by 
deposit money 
banks (% of GDP)
D_PCRED_DMB Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP.                                                                                            
FS/WB code: pcrdbgdp
12 months
percentage 
change
Annual A, B, M
8 Private credit by 
other financial 
institutions (% of 
GDP)
D_PCRED_OTH Private credit by other financial institutions to GDP. 
Difference between private credit by all 
fin.institutions and private credit by deposit money 
banks.                                                                      FS/WB 
code: pcrdbofgdp - pcrdbgdp
12 months 
percentage 
change
Annual B, M
9 Financial system 
deposits (% of 
GDP)
D_FSDEPOS Demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money 
banks and other financial institutions as a share of 
GDP.                                                                                     
FS/WB code: fdgdp
12 months 
percentage 
change
Annual A, B, M
10 Ratio Bank credit 
to bank deposits
D_BCRED_BDEP Private credit by deposit money banks as a share of 
demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money 
banks.                                                                                                               
FS/WB code: bcbd
12 months 
percentage 
change
Annual A, B, M
11 Net interest 
margin
NETINTMG Accounting value of bank's net interest revenue as a 
share of its interest-bearing (total earning) assets.                                                                                                    
FS/WB code: netintmargin
None Annual A, B, M
12 Bank 
concentration
BANKCONC Assets of three largest banks as a share of assets of 
all commercial banks.                                                                                                
FS/WB code: concentration
None Annual A, B, M
13 Bank ROE BANKROE Average Return on Equity (Net Income/Total 
Equity). FS/WB code: roe
None Annual A, B, M
14 Bank Z-Score BANKZ Z = 1.2A + 1.4B + 3.3C + 0.6D + 1.0E       with:                                                   
A = Working Capital/Total Assets                                                          
B = Retained Earnings/Total Assets                                                                             
C = EBIT/Total Assets                                                                                                                                           
D = Market Value of Equity/Total Liab                                                                                                                                  
E = Sales/Total Assets
None Annual B
15 Deposit money 
banks and other 
banking instit: 
assets
D_BANKASSET Sum of:                                                                                                
Deposit money banks Assets (IFS: 7A.DZF…)                                                                                                                          
Other banking institutions Assets (IFS: 7E.DZF…)
12 months 
percentage 
change
Monthly A
16 Deposit money 
banks and other 
banking 
institutions: 
liabilities
D_BANKLIAB Sum of:                                                                                                             
Deposit money banks Liabilities (IFS: 7B.DZF…)                                                                                                                                                                         
Other banking institutions Liabilities (IFS: 7F.DZF…)
12 months 
percentage
change
Monthly A
17 CB: foreign assets - 
foreign liabilities
D_CB_FA_FL Difference between:                                                               
Foreign assets (IFS: 11...ZF…)                                                                          
Foreign liabilities (16C..ZF…)
12 months 
percentage
change
Monthly A
18 CB: claims - 
deposits from 
central 
government 
D_CB_CGVT Difference between:                                                                     
Claims on central government (IFS: 12A..ZF…)                     
Central government deposits (IFS 16D..ZF…)
12 months 
percentage 
change
Monthly A
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19 CB: claims on 
deposit money 
banks and other 
banking inst.
D_CB_BANKS Sum of:                                                                                         
Claims on Deposit Money Banks (IFS: 12E..ZF…)                                                                                                          
Claims on Other banking institutions (IFS: 12F..ZF…)
12 months 
percentage
change
Monthly A
20 Bank sector: 
reserves
D_BANKRES Sum of:                                                                                               
Reserves from DMB (IFS: 20...ZF…)                                 
Reserves from other banking institutions (IFS: 
40...ZF…)
12 months 
percentage 
change
Monthly A
21 Bank sector: 
Foreign assets - 
foreign liabilities
D_BANK_FA_FL Difference between:                                                 
Foreign assets from banks (IFS: 21...ZF… + 41...ZF…)                                                                                    
Foreign liabilities from banks (IFS: 26C..ZF… + 
46C..ZF…)                   
12 months 
percentage 
change
Monthly A
22 Bank sector: claims 
on PPG 
D_BANK_PPG Claims on PPG:                                                                                               
Claims on central govt (IFS: 22A..ZF…  + 42A..ZF… )                                                                                                                     
Claims on state and local government (IFS: 22B..ZF…  
+ 42B..ZF…)                                                                                                    
Claims on official entities (IFS: 22BX.ZF… + 
42BX.ZF…)
12 months
percentage 
change
Monthly A
23 Banks: claims on 
private sector
D_BANK_PRIV Claims from DMB and other banking instit. on 
private sector (IFS: 22D..ZF… and 42D..ZF…)
12 months 
percentage 
change
Monthly A
24 Banks: demand 
deposits
D_BANK_ 
DEM_DEPOS
Demand deposits in DMB (IFS: 24...ZF…) 12 months 
percentage 
change
Monthly A
25 Banks: time, 
savings and foreign 
currency deposits
D_BANK_TSFC_DE
POS
Time, savings and foreign currency deposits (IFS: 
25...ZF… + 45...ZF…)
12 months 
percentage 
change
Monthly A
Institutional indicators: indices
1 Herfindahl Index 
Government 
HERFGOV DPI (World Bank / Beck et al. 2001): herfgov. 
Represents a measure of government coalition 
concentration, by squaring the percentage of parties 
in the government coalition. The presence of a 
majority party in the government coalition increases 
the index. Having many (small) parties in the 
government reduces it. 
None. Annual A, B, M
2 Herfindahl Index 
Opposition
HERFOPP DPI: herfopp.   Idem herfgov, but now for 
government opposition. 
None. Annual B, M
3 Political stability D_GOVSTAB On a scale from 0 to 12, with 12 the highest level of 
stability and 0 the highest level of instability. Source: 
ICRG
12 months 
percentage 
change. 
Annual A, B, M
4 Socioeconomic 
Conditions
D_SOCIOECO On a scale from 0 to 12, with 12 the highest level of 
socioeconomic conditions and 0 the lowest level. 
Source: ICRG
12 months 
percentage 
change
Annual A, B, M
5 Investment Profile D_INVPROF On a scale from 0 to 12, with 12 the best investment 
profile (= low risk) and 0 the worst profile. Source: 
ICRG
12 months 
percentage 
change
Annual A, B, M
6 Internal Conflict D_INTCONFL On a scale from 0 to 12, with 12 the lowest level of 
internal conflict (low risk) and 0 the highest level 
(high risk). Source: ICRG
12 months 
percentage 
change
Annual A, B, M
7 Democratic 
Accountability
D_DEMACC On a scale from 0 to 6, with 6 the highest level of 
dem.accountability and 0 the lowest level. Source: 
ICRG
12 months 
percentage 
change
Annual A, B, M
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8 Corruption D_CORRUPT ICRG. Scale 6 (low corruption) to 0 (high corruption).    12 months 
percentage 
change
Annual A, B, M
9 Law and Order D_LAWORD ICRG. Scale 6 (high law and order) to 0 (low law and 
order).      
12 months 
percentage 
change
Annual A, B, M
10 Bureaucracy 
Quality
D_BURQUAL ICRG. Scale 4 (high bureaucratic quality) to 0 (low 
bureaucratic quality).      
12 months 
percentage 
change
Annual A, B, M
Institutional indicators: dummies (not included in factor model)
1 Party orien-tation 
with resp. to econ. 
policy
GOVT_RLC Dummy indicates orientation of the executive 
power. Right (1); Left (3); Center (2); No information 
(0). DPI code: execrlc
None Annual A, B, M
2 Absolute majority 
in the houses 
GOVT_MAJ Dummy indicates if executive has absolute majority 
in the houses. 1 = yes, 0 = no. DPI code: allhouse
None Annual A, B, M
3 Degree of 
polarization 
POLARIZ Polarization is the maximum difference between the 
chief executive’s party’s value (EXECRLC) and the 
values of the three largest government parties and 
the largest opposition party. 0 = no polarization. DPI 
code: polariz
None Annual A, B, M
4 date of elections 
for executive 
power
ELECEXE Dummy variable with value 1 in the month of 
elections for executive power and 0 otherwise (DPI: 
dateexec, exelec)
The calender year 
of the elections is 
assigned 1.
Monthly A, B, M
5 Contagion of crises 
in the region
CONTAG Based on EMPI calculations: dummy = 1 if there is a 
financial crisis in one of the other LA3 countries
None Monthly A, B, M
Global economy indicators
1  US long term 
interest rate
D_USYIELD Yield on the 10 year US government bond (IFS: 
111.61.ZF)
12 months 
percentage 
change
Monthly USA
2 US short term 
interest rate
TBILL IFS: 11160C..ZF... None Monthly USA
3 US real GDP 
growth
D_GDPUSA IFS series: 11199B.CZF… and 11164..ZF… 12 months 
percentage 
change
Quarterly USA
4 GDP VOLUME % 
CHANGE
D_GDPWORLD Change (year-on-year) of the volume of the GDP 
growth. IFS series 00199BPXZF...
None Annual world
Commodity indicators
1 Agriculture, value 
added (% of GDP)
D_VA_AGRI WDI code: NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS 12 months 
percentage 
change
Annual A, B, M
2 Oil prices D_PR_PETROL World oil price (IFS: 00176AADZF...) 12 months 
percentage 
change
Monthly world
3 Agricultural 
commodities price 
index
D_PR_AGRI Global agricultural raw materials price index (IFS: 
00176BXDZF)
12 months 
percentage 
change
Monthly world
4 Metals 
commodities price 
index
D_PR_METAL Global metals price index (IFS: 00176AYDZF) 12 months 
percentage 
change
Monthly world
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5 Agricultural raw 
materials exports: 
D_AGRI_EXP Agricultural raw material exports, expressed as % of 
GDP.                                                                                                                
Elaborated from the following series:                                         
Agricultural raw material exports, as % of 
merchandise exports. Source: WDI, code: 
TX.VAL.AGRI.ZS.UN                                                        
Goods exports (BoP, current US$; Source: WDI, 
code: BX.GSR.MRCH.CD)                                                              
GDP (current US$; Source: WDI, code: 
NY.GDP.MKTP.CD) 
12 months 
percentage 
change
Annual A, B, M
6 Food materials 
exports: 
D_FOOD_EXP Idem, but food materials exports. Source: WDI, 
code: TX.VAL.FOOD.ZS.UN
Idem Annual A, B, M
7 Fuel exports: D_FUEL_EXP Idem, but fuel exports. Source: WDI, code: 
TX.VAL.FUEL.ZS.UN
Idem Annual A, B, M
8 Ores and metals 
exports: 
D_METAL_EXP Idem but ores and metals exports. Source: WDI, 
code: TX.VAL.MMTL.ZS.UN
Idem Annual A, B, M
9 Agricultural raw 
materials imports: 
D_AGRI_IMP Agricultural raw material imports, expressed as % of 
GDP.                                                                                                                        
Elaborated from the following series:                                         
Agricultural raw material imports, as % of 
merchandise imports. Source: WDI, code: 
TM.VAL.AGRI.ZS.UN                                                        
Goods imports (BoP, current US$; Source: WDI, 
code: BM.GSR.MRCH.CD)                                                              
GDP (current US$; Source: WDI, code: 
NY.GDP.MKTP.CD)
Idem Annual A, B, M
10 Food materials 
imports: 
D_FOOD_IMP Idem, but food materials imports. Source: WDI, 
code: TM.VAL.FOOD.ZS.UN
Idem Annual A, B, M
11 Fuel imports: D_FUEL_IMP Idem, but fuel imports. Source: WDI, code: 
TM.VAL.FUEL.ZS.UN
Idem Annual A, B, M
12 Ores and metals 
imports: 
D_METAL_IMP Idem, but ores and metals imports. Source: WDI, 
code: TM.VAL.MMTL.ZS.UN
Idem Annual A, B, M
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B Correlations of factors with indicators
ARGENTINA
For each of the 11 factors: ten variables with highest correlation with the factor
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
D_BANK_PRIV 0.8789 bank REALINT 0.6532 Eco Dom GFCAP_GDP -0.6160 Eco Dom
D_BANK_TSFC_DEPOS 0.7811 bank D_INDPROD -0.7123 Eco Dom HHCONS_GDP 0.6044 Eco Dom
BANKROE 0.7953 bank M2MULT 0.7574 Eco Dom INFLAT 0.5475 Eco Dom
D_DMBANKAS -0.8492 bank D_RGDP -0.6483 Eco Dom TOT -0.5990 Eco Ext
NETINTMG -0.7781 bank GDSAV_GDP -0.7204 Eco Dom D_TBILL -0.7488 global
DCREDBANK -0.8505 bank D_IMP -0.6938 Eco Ext D_GDPWORLD -0.6921 global
D_VA_AGRI -0.8549 commodity ERVOL -0.7968 Eco Ext D_BCRED_BDEP -0.6112 bank
D_AGRI_EXP -0.7831 commodity BANKCONC -0.6978 bank D_CB_BANKS 0.5518 bank
D_FOOD_EXP -0.8734 commodity DCREDPUB -0.6780 bank D_PR_METAL -0.6684 commodity
D_METAL_EXP -0.8064 commodity ARR_TDEBT -0.8781 debt D_CORRUPT 0.5951 institutional
Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6
M2MULT 0.5068 eco dom D_GDPUSA 0.3864 Global UNEMPL 0.4022 Eco Dom
D_FSDEPOS -0.5708 bank D_BANKASSET 0.5400 bank D_IMP 0.2938 Eco Ext
NETINTMG -0.4619 bank D_BANKLIAB 0.4369 bank M2RES 0.5223 Eco Ext
D_LIQLIAB -0.5828 bank D_CB_CGVT -0.5357 bank D_IMPCOV -0.5443 Eco Ext
D_PCRED_DMB -0.4497 bank D_AGRI_IMP 0.3804 commodity D_BANK_PPG 0.5365 bank
D_LTPNG_DEBT -0.5801 debt D_CORRUPT -0.4420 institutional BANKROE -0.3773 bank
DSERV_EXP 0.5373 debt D_INTCONFL -0.6104 institutional D_BCRED_BDEP -0.4395 bank
DSERV_RES 0.7348 debt D_LAWORD -0.4351 institutional D_PCRED_GDP -0.3933 bank
D_BURQUAL -0.5885 institutional D_SOCIOECO -0.4210 institutional D_LTPPG_DEBT -0.3667 debt
D_GOVSTAB 0.5199 institutional D_BURQUAL -0.3749 institutional D_SOCIOECO -0.5023 institutional
Factor 7 Factor 8 Factor 9
D_M2 -0.5498 Eco Dom NETFDI_GDP 0.4135 Eco Ext GOVCONS_GDP 0.2874 Eco Dom
INFLAT 0.4025 Eco Dom D_GDPUSA 0.2891 global D_RES -0.2846 Eco Ext
D_GDPUSA -0.4027 global D_USYIELD 0.3807 global D_BANKLIAB -0.3034 bank
D_BANKRES -0.4359 bank D_BANKASSET -0.2959 bank D_PCRED_DMB 0.2717 bank
D_BCRED_BDEP 0.3246 bank D_CB_CGVT -0.4553 bank D_FOOD_IMP -0.5438 commodity
D_FSDEPOS -0.3851 bank D_BANKRES -0.3297 bank D_FUEL_IMP -0.3567 commodity
D_LIQLIAB -0.4289 bank D_PR_AGRI 0.3715 commodity D_METAL_IMP -0.3711 commodity
D_PCRED_DMB -0.3303 bank D_PR_PETROL 0.5764 commodity D_LTPNG_DEBT 0.3432 debt
STD_DEBT 0.3857 debt DSERV_EXP 0.3828 debt D_RES_DEBT 0.4292 debt
D_INTCONFL -0.3555 institutional HERFGOV -0.4756 institutional REDU_TDEBT -0.3841 debt
Factor 10 Factor 11
D_EXP 0.3209 Eco Ext M2RES 0.3006 Eco Ext
D_IMPCOV -0.2908 Eco Ext TOT -0.3490 Eco Ext
D_USYIELD 0.2451 global D_GDPUSA 0.2690 global
D_BANKLIAB 0.3482 bank D_BANK_FA_FL 0.2962 bank
D_BANK_PPG -0.3082 bank D_BANK_PPG -0.3225 bank
D_LIQLIAB -0.2477 bank D_FUEL_EXP -0.3080 commodity
D_LTPPG_DEBT 0.4191 debt D_PR_AGRI -0.2962 commodity
REDU_TDEBT 0.3116 debt D_LTPNG_DEBT 0.2689 debt
STD_DEBT -0.2971 debt D_LTPPG_DEBT -0.3998 debt
D_INVPROF 0.2992 institutional D_INVPROF 0.3288 institutional
39
BRAZIL
For each of the 9 factors: ten variables with highest correlation with the factor
Factor 1 Factor 4 Factor 7
PCRED_DMB 0.7039 Bank DMBANKAS -0.6147 Bank BANKCONC -0.3844 Bank
PCRED_OTH 0.6966 Bank FSDEPOS -0.4936 Bank LTDPPG_TDEBT 0.5213 Debt
DEBT_GDP -0.7876 Debt LIQLIAB -0.5122 Bank GR_M2 0.3778 Econ.Dom.
DSERV_EXP -0.8467 Debt AGRI_IMP -0.5176 Commodities GR_RES -0.5761 Econ.Ext.
DSERV_RES -0.8231 Debt FUEL_IMP -0.5355 Commodities M2RES 0.3762 Econ.Ext.
GR_GCAP 0.7574 Econ.Dom. METAL_IMP -0.4799 Commodities IMPCOV -0.5767 Econ.Ext.
GR_IMP 0.7055 Econ.Ext PETROL -0.4914 Commodities FOOD_IMP -0.5306 Commodities
RER_DEV -0.8145 Econ.Ext GR_GDPUSA -0.6409 global HERFGOV 0.4058 institutional
METAL_EXP -0.7030 Commodities GDPWORLD -0.5367 global HERFOPP -0.4110 institutional
HERFOPP -0.7522 Institutional SOCIOECO 0.8461 institutional LAWORD 0.5088 institutional
Factor 2 Factor 5 Factor 8
BANKROE -0.6816 Bank BANKZ 0.5058 Bank BANKCONC -0.3333 Bank
BCRED_BDEP -0.7015 Bank CBASSET -0.4014 Bank CBASSET -0.6482 Bank
DCREDPUB_GDP -0.7074 Bank DCREDPUB_GDP -0.3908 Bank DCREDPUB_GDP -0.3647 Bank
DCREDGDP -0.6966 Bank RGDPCAP_GR 0.5624 Econ.Dom. NETINTMG -0.4587 Bank
ARR_TDEBT 0.6919 Debt GR_GOVREV -0.4146 Econ.Dom. STD_DEBT 0.3313 Debt
LTDPNG_TDEBT 0.7465 Debt GR_VA_AGRI -0.8686 Commodities INDPROD 0.3354 Econ.Dom.
GDSAV_GDP -0.7005 Econ.Dom. FOOD_EXP -0.5284 Commodities GR_UNEMPL 0.4188 Econ.Dom.
ERVOL -0.7166 Econ.Ext DEMACC -0.5537 institutional ERVOL 0.4491 Econ.Ext.
BURQUAL -0.7420 Institutional INTCONFL -0.5194 institutional AGRI_IMP 0.3317 Commodities
HERFGOV 0.7019 Institutional LAWORD 0.5003 institutional BURQUAL 0.5127 institutional
Factor 3 Factor 6 Factor 9
BANKCONC -0.4857 Bank DCREDPUB_GDP -0.3684 Bank BANKZ -0.6375 Bank
PCRED_DMB -0.5874 Bank PCRED_DMB -0.4172 Bank CBASSET 0.2946 Bank
REDU_TDEBT -0.6471 Debt IMF_GDP 0.4253 Debt LTDPNG_TDEBT 0.2888 Debt
RES_DEBT -0.4807 Debt ERVOL 0.3756 Econ.Ext. RGDPGR -0.2946 Econ.Dom.
INFLAT 0.5656 Econ.Dom. AGRI_IMP 0.5827 Commodities GR_GCAP -0.4027 Econ.Dom.
GR_RES -0.5860 Econ.Ext. FUEL_EXP -0.5469 Commodities FA_GDP -0.3342 Econ.Ext.
RER_DEV 0.5160 Econ.Ext. PETROL 0.3916 Commodities METAL_IMP -0.3279 Commodities
AGRI_EXP 0.5646 Commodities GR_GDPUSA 0.3748 Global GR_GDPUSA 0.3037 Global
FOOD_IMP 0.4667 Commodities INVPROF -0.7557 institutional GOVSTAB -0.4054 institutional
INTSPREAD 0.7616 Financial SOCIOECO -0.5621 institutional INVPROF -0.2914 institutional
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MEXICO
For each of the 7 factors: ten variables with highest correlation 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
BANKCONC 0.7472 bank DCREDBANK -0.7681 bank D_BCRED_BDEP -0.5435 bank
D_FSDEPOS 0.6907 bank DEBT_GDP -0.8818 debt D_DMBANKAS -0.5725 bank
D_LIQLIAB 0.6972 bank IMF_GDP -0.9061 debt DCREDPUB 0.7434 bank
D_LTPPG_DEBT 0.6865 debt STD_DEBT -0.5993 debt D_RES_DEBT 0.6375 debt
RER_DEV -0.8636 ext eco INFLAT -0.9472 dom eco REALINT -0.7373 dom eco
CA_GDP -0.7453 ext eco GFCAP_GDP 0.6923 dom eco GDSAV_GDP 0.6997 dom eco
D_AGRI_IMP -0.7558 comm D_TRD_OPEN -0.5842 ext eco D_CETES -0.5522 dom eco
D_FUEL_EXP -0.6946 comm D_AGRI_EXP -0.7492 comm GR_RES 0.5996 ext eco
D_METAL_EXP -0.7417 comm D_FOOD_EXP -0.7013 comm D_BURQUAL -0.7458 instit
D_METAL_IMP -0.7948 comm D_SOCIOECO 0.6267 instit D_INTCONFL -0.6049 instit
Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6
INDPROD 0.5558 dom eco BANKROE -0.5144 bank D_DMBANKAS -0.6643 bank
DSERV_RES 0.5174 debt D_PCRED_DMB -0.4602 bank D_FSDEPOS -0.4292 bank
GR_IMP 0.4673 ext eco D_PCRED_OTH -0.4381 bank D_LIQLIAB -0.4885 bank
IMPCOV -0.4970 ext eco ARR_TDEBT -0.4122 debt D_PCRED_DMB -0.5294 bank
D_GDPUSA 0.4992 global REDU_TDEBT 0.5016 debt D_PCRED_OTH -0.5339 bank
USYIELD 0.4810 global M2MULT 0.5794 dom eco D_LTPNG_DEBT 0.7329 debt
TBILL 0.4749 global INVCHG_GDP -0.4446 dom eco D_LTPPG_DEBT -0.3978 debt
D_CORRUPT -0.5330 instit TOT -0.5492 ext eco D_FOOD_IMP 0.5013 comm
D_GOVSTAB 0.4555 instit NETFDI_GDP 0.4498 ext eco D_GOVSTAB -0.5828 instit
D_INVPROF 0.4635 instit D_GDPWORLD -0.4678 global HERFOPP 0.4384 instit
Factor 7
ARR_TDEBT 0.3411 debt
INDPROD -0.3972 dom eco
GOVBAL_GDP -0.3858 dom eco
D_CETES 0.2992 dom eco
GR_IMP -0.4727 ext eco
FA_GDP -0.3411 ext eco
NETPI_GDP -0.5651 ext eco
D_GDPWORLD -0.2998 global
D_LAWORD 0.3505 instit
D_SOCIOECO 0.5133 instit
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Argentina - excluding institutional indicators
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